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Case No. 20060327-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of offering 
or arranging to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), a 
first degree felony, enhanced for its commission in concert with 
two or more others (R. 83-84) . This court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(j)(West 2004). See R. 102; Utah R. App. P. 42(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction where 
defendant, standing by the side of a road at midnight and using a 
"head nod" gesture typical of drug traffickers, twice signaled to 
undercover officers to pull over, approached their vehicle, and 
responded to the officer's inquiry about cocaine availability by 
asking, "How much you want? A hundred? They are big rocks." 
1 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime.,/ State v. Goddard, 871 P. 2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (West 2004), governing 
prohibited controlled substances, provides: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it 
is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
• • • 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one enhanced count of unlawful 
distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(West 
2004) (R. 1-4). A jury convicted him of committing the crime in 
concert with two or more other people, but acquitted him of doing 
so within 1000 feet of a shopping center (R. 48-50). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to 365 days in the Salt Lake County 
jail, with credit for 138 days served (R. 83-84). The court did 
not order either probation or treatment (R. 107: 4-5). Defendant 
2 
filed a timely appeal, and the Supreme Court transferred the case 
to this Court (R. 90-91, 102). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Near midnight in mid-October of 2005, in the vicinity of the 
Rio Grande homeless shelter, five Salt Lake Police Department 
vice squad officers in an unmarked van were patrolling for 
prostitution (R. 104: 17, 21-22, 34). One of the officers, 
Detective Boelter, testified that as they drove down 500 South, 
several people "waved [them] over," a tactic commonly used to 
initiate an illegal drug sale (Id. at 25). He explained: 
During my experience, when we have made 
arrests down there, generally, what the 
individuals will do, . . . they stand on the 
street corners, on the sidewalks, or in the 
center of the divide, and as cars will drive 
by they start walking out to the street, they 
will start whistling, they will start hooting 
and hollering type of thing. As the cars 
pull to the side of the road, the individuals 
will approach the passenger's side or 
driver's side and basically conduct the drug 
sale at that time. 
(Id. at 25-26). Noticing drug-related activity, the officers 
drove past the men on the street and pulled around the corner, 
where they "came up with a plan" to "go back and try to make an 
arrangement . . . [to] attempt to buy drugs" (Id. at 26). 
1
 On appeal, the evidence must be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict, recognizing that it is within 
the "exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). 
3 
With Detective Boelter in the front passenger seat, the 
officers drove down 500 South a second time (Id. at 27). Several 
individuals tried to get their attention (Id. at 26-27, 34). The 
van pulled over and stopped (Id. at 27, 34). Defendant and a man 
named Smith approached the front passenger window simultaneously 
(Id. at 27, 43, 34, 35). 
Detective Boelter testified: 
The first thing I asked is, What you got? 
Mr. Smith was first to respond. . . At that 
time, he stated, What you want? I asked, You 
got rock? From my training and experience 
rock is a very common street term used for 
crack cocaine. At that time, [defendant] 
stated, How much you want? A hundred? They 
are big rocks. 
Id. at 27-28. Detective Boelter consulted with the other men in 
the van and then suggested "60," meaning sixty dollars, at which 
point Smith told him he'd "be right back" (Id.).2 As Smith 
walked away, defendant stayed by the window and another man named 
Jones, who had been standing about 10 feet behind defendant and 
Smith, approached the van holding six rocks of crack cocaine (Id. 
2
 Detective Boelter explained: 
The individual that approaches the car to 
make the transaction . . . generally does not 
hold the drugs on them at that time. They 
have somebody else in the area that has it. . 
. . The reason for that is if that individual 
gets arrested at the car, then the individual 
that actually has the larger quantity of 
drugs is not arrested. . . So they don't lose 
the whole stash of drugs. . . 
Id. at 31. 
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at 29-30). After Jones handed the cocaine to Detective Boelter, 
the officers exited the van and arrested defendant, Jones, Smith, 
and one other individual (Id. at 30). 
Three of the four other officers in the van also testified. 
Detective Johnson, the driver, testified that when they first 
drove down 500 South, defendant "did make head nod gestures to 
us. The first time around the block, however, we didn't stop" 
(Id. at 57). On the second pass, he said, "[w]e found 
[defendant] again, same situation, head nods. We pulled over to 
see if we could find narcotics" (Id.). Defendant and another 
man, probably Smith, appeared "at the [passenger] window 
immediately" (Id. at 58). Johnson corroborated that one man 
asked, "How about a hundred?" (Id.). 
Detective Kirkwood, whose attention was focused behind the 
van for security purposes, testified only that defendant 
approached the van with another man (Id. at 72-73). Detective 
Holmes, sitting in the rear of the van with limited visibility, 
corroborated how the situation played out generally, but could 
not provide any details (Id. at 84-86). 
Defendant testified that he lived at the homeless shelter on 
500 South (Id. at 95, 97). Although he was a disabled veteran 
and was unable to work, he would sometimes pick up day jobs (Id. 
at 95, 97). He testified that people would look for workers by 
driving around the shelter and pulling up to hire people and that 
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"they will come at any time . . . [d]ay or night" (Id. at 98). 
Of the van that stopped at midnight, defendant testified: 
I thought they were looking for workers. It 
looked like one of them work kind of 
vehicles. I walked over there . . . [j]ust 
to see what they was offering, what kind of 
work it was. . . . I was just being 
inquisitive. I just walked over there to 
find out. 
(Id. at 98). Defendant further testified that while he was 
acquainted with both Smith and Jones, he didn't know either man 
well (Id. at 99-100). He denied being involved in any plan to 
sell drugs and maintained that he did nothing but stand by the 
van (Id. at 100-02). He maintained that he did not ask the 
officers if they wanted to buy rock, did not negotiate the price, 
and did not know that Jones and Smith were selling drugs (Id. at 
106) . 
A jury convicted defendant as charged, with an enhancement 
for committing the crime in concert with two or more others. At 
sentencing, the court noted that "the recommendation [of AP&P] is 
for jail as opposed to prison probably because of the involvement 
[defendant] had and the quantity of narcotics involved, and I 
would agree with the recommendation" (R. 107: 5). Accordingly, 
although the jury convicted defendant of a first degree felony, 
the court sentenced him only to jail for 365 days, with credit 
for 138 days served. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's acts of twice signaling a vehicle to stop in an 
area known to the officers for its drug transactions, his 
subsequent approach to the van, and his response, "How much you 
want? A hundred? They are big rocks," to the query, "You got 
rock?" together suffice to sustain his conviction for offering or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR OFFERING 
OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WHERE 
DEFENDANT SIGNALED A VEHICLE TO 
STOP IN AN AREA KNOWN FOR DRUG 
TRAFFICKING, APPROACHED THE 
VEHICLE, AND RESPONDED TO AN 
INQUIRY FOR COCAINE BY ASKING, "HOW 
MUCH YOU WANT? A HUNDRED? THEY ARE 
BIG ROCKS" 
Defendant argues that the marshaled evidence fails to 
support his conviction because the state did not adduce evidence 
that defendant "took active steps i^n furtherance' of or to 
facilitate a distribution" or that he "engaged in conduct knowing 
or intending that a distribution ^would, or would be likely to 
occur.'" Br. of Pet. at 13-14 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT 
App 159, 11 9-10, 3 P.3d 725, abrogated on other grounds by State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 1 16, 20 P.3d 300).3 
3
 Defendant appears to be challenging only the conviction 
for offering or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
His appellate brief makes no specific mention of the enhancement 
for committing the crime in concert with two or more others. 
Consequently, that issue is not before the Court for review. 
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An appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence following a criminal conviction is limited. State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). A reviewing court 
will reverse a criminal conviction on insufficiency grounds only 
when the evidence is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the 
crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), 
superseded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987). However, M[w]here there is any evidence, including 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which 
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a 
reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the 
verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). 
The statute under which defendant was convicted provides 
that "it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally . . . offer[] or arrange to distribute a controlled 
• . . substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (West 
2004) . The caselaw interpreting this statute is clear. All that 
is necessary to establish the offense is a knowing or intentional 
mental state along with an offer or arrangement to distribute 
drugs. State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 n.5 (Utah 1979). 
Intent to commit the crime, usually not susceptible to 
direct proof, can be inferred from defendant's actions or from 
surrounding circumstances. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 
110, 988 P.2d 949. Proof of an actual sale can be helpful in 
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establishing knowledge or intent but is not a necessary element 
of the crime. State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 1 12, 3 P.3D 723 
(citing cases in which, "[e]ven absent proof of a completed 
distribution, . . . [other types of evidence] reveal the 
defendant's intent by showing that the defendant took active 
steps to facilitate the completion of an illicit transaction"). 
As to the act of offering or arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance, "any witting or intentional lending of aid 
in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is 
proscribed by the act." State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923; 
accord State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 11 9-10; State v. 
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App 1990); State v. Gray, 717 
P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986). Thus, if defendant serves as 
"one link in a chain of events . . . which eventually led to the 
sale of [an unlawful controlled substance]," he is culpable under 
the statute. State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185. 
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict and leaving all determinations of 
witness credibility to the trier of fact, the evidence sufficed 
to conclude that defendant knew what he was doing, intended his 
actions, and took active steps to facilitate the completion of a 
drug transaction. 
Defendant stood outside at midnight on a street known for 
its drug-trafficking and intentionally initiated communication 
with passing vehicles by nodding his head (R. 104: 57). Given 
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the location, the trained officers who were driving by understood 
the gesture as an invitation to stop and buy illegal drugs (Id. 
at 25-26, 57, 84). When the officers drove down the street a 
second time, defendant repeated the gesture, thus confirming his 
intent to interact with them (Id. at 57). When the van pulled 
over, defendant immediately approached the window along with 
another individual, Smith (Id. at 27, 32, 35, 58). Defendant 
thus plainly intended to communicate with the van occupants. 
The nature of the communication was soon revealed. The 
officer asked, "What you got?" but made no mention of any illegal 
substances (Id. at 27). Smith turned the question back on the 
officer, asking, "What you want?" The officer then introduced 
the subject of illegal drugs by asking for "rock," the street 
name for crack cocaine (Id. at 27). With the conversation now 
clearly focused on illegal drugs, defendant helped moved the 
transaction forward by asking, "How much you want? A hundred? 
They are big rocks" (Id. at 28). He thus offered a selling price 
for the drugs, with which he was sufficiently familiar to 
describe them as "big rocks." 
At this juncture, defendant became culpable for offering or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance. By both his 
actions and words, he knowingly and intentionally took an active 
step in moving a drug sale forward. He initiated the stop of the 
vehicle, and he approached the vehicle. Once the officer named 
his drug of choice, defendant began the process of negotiating 
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the price by asking the officer if he wanted $100 worth of crack 
cocaine, thus moving the sale one step closer to fruition. By 
these actions, defendant became "one link in a chain of events," 
which was leading inexorably to a sale of cocaine. State v. 
Pelton, 801 P.2d at 185. No more is necessary to sustain his 
conviction for offering or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of distributing a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or agreeing, consenting, offering, or 
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
a first degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this OS day of September, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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